The remuneration of independent directors in the UK and Italy: An empirical analysis based on agency theory by Mallin, Chris et al.
 1 
 
The Remuneration of Independent Directors in the UK and Italy: 
An empirical analysis based on agency theory 
 
 
 
Chris Mallin 
University of East Anglia 
 
Andrea Melis 
Silvia Gaia 
University of Cagliari 
 
 
 
Accepted for publication at International Business Review (2nd July 2014) 
 2 
 
The Remuneration of Independent Directors in the UK and Italy: 
An empirical analysis based on agency theory 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates independent non-executive directors’ remuneration from an agency 
theory perspective, taking into account both optimal contracting and managerial power 
perspectives. Using a sample of 1733 independent non-executive directors’ year observations in 
Italian and UK non-financial firms listed in the period 2007-2009, we find that in both countries 
independent non-executive directors’ remuneration is mainly based on the observable effort they 
exert and their responsibilities. Our findings also show that independent non-executive directors 
who do not fulfil formal independence criteria, as stated in the respective national corporate 
governance codes, seem to be paid more than those who do fulfil such criteria, particularly in the 
UK. 
Our findings contribute to the existing literature by providing evidence on the determinants of 
independent non-executive directors’ remuneration in two major European economies and offer 
insights to policy-makers by questioning the effectiveness of adopting non-binding criteria when 
assessing non-executive directors’ independence. 
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The Remuneration of Independent Directors in the UK and Italy: An 
empirical analysis based on agency theory 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Independent non-executive directors (hereafter INEDs) are expected to act as monitors of, and 
advisors to, executive directors on behalf of shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). INEDs 
represent a key corporate governance mechanism and their presence on the board of directors 
and on the board committees is a commonly recommended governance practice (Zattoni & 
Cuomo, 2010). Although it has been argued that candidates may be attracted to INED positions 
for other than pecuniary reasons (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Mace, 1971: 109; Lorsch & MacIver 
1989: 30), empirical evidence has shown that remuneration is an essential factor for INEDs 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2008; Certo, Dalton, Dalton & Lester, 2008).  
 
On the one hand, INEDs’ remuneration signals the quality and effectiveness of INEDs in 
performing their roles. INEDs are facing increasing duties and legal responsibilities, the demand 
for effective supervision by INEDs being reflected in the latest regulatory initiatives in various 
countries (Lazar, Metzner, Rapp & Wolff, 2014). This increase in INEDs’ duties and legal 
responsibilities leads not only to a greater time commitment but also exposes INEDs to a greater 
reputational risk. High levels of INEDs’ remuneration could reflect the time commitment 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2008) and reputational risk that accompanies the INEDs role (e.g., Linck, 
Netter & Yang, 2009; Aguir, Burns, Mansi & Wald, 2014). On the other hand, INEDs’ 
remuneration might also reveal INEDs’ ineffectiveness because of the potential reciprocity 
between INEDs and corporate insiders where  ineffective monitoring makes corporate insiders 
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more inclined towards INEDs’ remuneration increases (Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, 2002). From 
this perspective, INEDs’ remuneration could represent a “reward” for ineffective monitoring 
actions resulting from the collusion between INEDs and corporate insiders. Therefore 
understanding more about INEDs’ remuneration is particularly important. However, despite its 
theoretical and practical relevance, the remuneration of INEDs has received little attention so far 
and has been referred as an “enigma” (Hahn & Lasfer, 2011; Magnan, St-Onge & Gélinas, 2010), 
regarding both the amount and the design (Shen, 2005; Brown, 2007; Magnan et al., 2010). In 
this paper we help to fill this lacuna in the literature. 
 
Most of the literature on corporate governance, including the studies on the design and level of 
directors’ remuneration, mainly relies on agency theory (e.g., Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990; Cordeiro, Veliyath & Eramus, 2000; Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos & Murphy, 
2013). This study aims at investigating to what extent agency theory can explain INEDs’ 
remuneration in different contexts, taking into account both an optimal contracting view and a 
managerial power perspective. In particular it considers the potential determinants of INEDs’ 
remuneration as being the INEDs’ effort and responsibilities that are observable by shareholders 
and also the INEDs’ potential conflicts of interest where the formal independence criteria, as 
embodied in the corporate governance codes, have not been adhered to.  
 
The paper makes a number of key contributions to the existing body of knowledge. First, it 
provides new insights on the determinants of INEDs’ remuneration, in particular the criteria by 
which INEDs are remunerated, which is an important issue given the potential for agency 
problems between boards of directors and shareholders (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Certo et al., 2008; 
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Andreas, Rapp & Wolff, 2012). In particular, by analysing the influence played by INEDs’ 
observable effort/responsibilities and/or the conflicts of interest in their remuneration in Europe, 
we extend the scant literature which is mainly focused on the debate in North America on 
whether the pay-for-performance principles for rewarding executive directors are applicable to 
INEDs (e.g., Hempel & Fay, 1994; Cordeiro et al., 2000; Yermack, 2004; Ronen, Tzur & Yaari, 
2006; Magnan et al., 2010). Given the characteristics of the INEDs’ job as well as the 
recommendations by most corporate governance codes in Europe (e.g., UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2012; Italian Code of Conduct, 2006, 2011; Dutch Corporate Governance 
Code, 2008; Spanish Unified Good Governance Code, 2006; ICGN, 2010) investigating whether 
INEDs’ remuneration reflects their  effort and responsibilities and/or rather a conflict of interest 
becomes relevant as it provides an understanding as to what extent INEDs’ remuneration reflects 
an optimal contracting perspective or a managerial power perspective of agency theory. In line 
with the Van Essen, Otten, and Carberry (2014) study on executive remuneration, we find that 
optimal contracting and managerial power perspectives seem to provide complementary, rather 
than competing, explanations to INED’s remuneration, as they encompass different contracting 
arrangements covered by agency theory. 
 
Second, by conducting a study on two institutional settings, Italy and the UK, that can be 
characterised as opposite ends of a spectrum in terms of their corporate governance practices, we 
investigate whether agency theory can be applied to very different contexts (e.g., Bowe, 
Filatotchev, Marshall, 2010; Cho, Huang & Padmanabhan, 2014). Critics of agency theory have 
pointed out its under-contextualized nature, and hence its inability to accurately compare and 
explain the diversity of corporate governance practices across different institutional contexts 
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(e.g., Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Van Essen, Heugens, Otten & Van Oosterhout, 2012). In this 
vein, Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel & Jackson (2008) argue that a 'closed-system approach' 
within agency theory posits a universal set of relationships between corporate governance 
practices and devotes little attention to the distinct contexts in which firms are embedded. 
However, supporters of agency theory argue that agency theory does not necessarily rule out 
institutional factors (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1988; Bender, 2004; Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez & 
Gomez-Mejia, 2012). Despite the fact that agency problems (such as information asymmetry, 
conflicts of interest, and opportunistic agent’s behaviour) are universal, as long as delegation is 
involved, their explicit manifestation and the ways to deal with them may vary depending on 
institutional context (Wiseman et al., 2012). Agency contracts are socially embedded such that 
differences in the institutional contexts surrounding the principal-agent relation can affect the 
form of governance that is used (Wiseman et al., 2012). 
 
Third, the choice of these institutional settings answers the call of Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra  
(2009) for a more careful examination of what each Code of Corporate Governance contains to 
understand the soundness of its recommendations as they are not homogeneous in content.  In 
contrast with most of the corporate governance codes in Europe (e.g., Spanish Unified Good 
Governance Code, 2006; Austrian Code of Corporate Governance, 2009; German Corporate 
Governance Code, 2009) that have adopted a rules-based approach by requiring companies to 
consider a non-executive director to be independent only when several criteria are met, Italy and 
the UK are both countries whose corporate governance codes allow companies to deem a 
director as independent notwithstanding that all the independence criteria stated by the Codes are 
not fulfilled (Italian Code of Conduct, 2006; 2011; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012). In 
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such cases companies should explain this decision in the corporate governance report. This 
unique approach allows us to analyse the potential differences, in terms of overall remuneration 
as well as the relation with INEDs’ effort and responsibilities, amongst the INEDs who fulfil all 
the independence criteria and those who do not. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides some background on the 
institutional settings for INEDs’ remuneration in Italy and the UK. This is followed by the 
literature review and hypotheses’ development. We then describe the research methodology, 
followed by the findings. Discussion of the results, concluding remarks and the limitations of the 
study are presented in the final section. 
 
2. Institutional settings 
The settings of Italy and the UK were chosen on the basis that important differences exist 
between the two corporate governance systems (Melis, 2000). Comparing institutional settings 
characterized by such diversity in corporate governance practices should enhance the potential 
generalizability of the findings, by allowing account to be taken of the potential variation 
existing in governance practices in firms that operate in highly developed countries (e.g., 
Minichilli, Zattoni, Nielsen & Huse 2012). Italy is representative of the Latin civil law based 
‘insider-oriented’ corporate governance system, while the UK is an example of the Anglo-
American market-based outsider-oriented common law system (Weimer & Pape, 1999). 
Although Italian and UK firms operate in some of the largest and most developed economies, 
UK firms are often considered as having the best corporate governance practices in Europe 
(RiskMetrics, 2009; Heidrick & Struggles, 2009), while Italian firms have often been taken as an 
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example of bad corporate governance practices (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997; Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer, 2000, Volpin, 2002).  
 
Moreover, UK listed firms are usually characterised by a principal-agent problem (Mallin, 2010), 
while Italian listed firms are characterized by a principal-principal agency problem (Melis, 
2000), and different agency problems might have a different influence on remuneration practices 
(Bebchuk et al., 2002; Filatotchev & Allcock, 2010) as well as on the role of INEDs (Johanson & 
Østergren, 2010).  
 
2.1. Italy 
Italian non-financial listed firms are characterised by the presence of a controlling shareholder 
who is able to monitor directors (Melis, 2000; Volpin, 2002). His/her presence reduces the 
agency problem between executive directors and shareholders, but gives rise to the principal-
principal agency problem between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders (Zattoni 
1999; Melis, 2000). The appointment of an adequate number of INEDs to the board has been 
considered as a solution ‘for guaranteeing the composition of the interests of all the shareholders, 
both majority and minority ones’ (Italian Code of Conduct, 2006; 2011). The Italian Code of 
Conduct provisions regarding non-executive director independence are detailed and compared 
with those of the UK Corporate Governance Code in Table 1. Nonetheless, the independence 
criteria are not binding for the board which can adopt additional or different criteria to assess 
non-executive director independence. 
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The Italian Code of Conduct (2006; 2011) does not recommend appointing an INED as 
chairperson of the board, and such a position is often held by the controlling shareholder  (Melis 
& Gaia, 2011). To provide a balance of power with the non-independent chairperson, it 
recommends that a lead (senior) independent director (hereafter SID) should be appointed in 
those firms whose chairperson is also the CEO and/or the controlling shareholder. 
 
The Italian Code of Conduct (2006; 2011) recommends that INEDs’ remuneration should not be 
linked – other than for a non-significant portion – to firm performance. Receiving significant 
additional remuneration, compared to the ‘fixed’ remuneration of other non-executive directors, 
and/or being a beneficiary of a share-based plan, are considered situations that could affect non-
executive directors’ independence. Remuneration should be proportionate to the commitment 
required by each director, also taking into account his/her participation in board committees. 
 
2.2. The UK 
The Cadbury Report (1992) emphasized the contribution that INEDs could make, stating that 
‘the calibre of the non-executive members of the board is of special importance in setting and 
maintaining standards of corporate governance’ (para 4.10). The UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2012) continues this view, placing much emphasis on the role of INEDs. The main board 
sub-committees (audit, remuneration and nomination) should be comprised of mainly, or wholly, 
INEDs. Section B.1.1 of the UK Corporate Governance Code defines the tests of independence 
for non-executive directors and these are detailed in Table 1, together with comparative 
independence criteria from the Italian Code of Conduct. In the context of smaller companies, 
section B.1.2 states that ‘except for smaller companies, at least half the board, excluding the 
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chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be independent. A 
smaller company should have at least two INEDs.’ 
  
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
In the UK, as in Italy, despite an individual not meeting these criteria the board could consider a 
non-executive director to be independent if s(he) can be considered to be ‘independent in 
character and judgement’.  
 
In relation to INEDs’ remuneration, the UK Corporate Governance Code states that remuneration 
for non-executive directors should reflect their time commitment and responsibilities. It should 
not include share options or other performance-related elements. If, exceptionally, options are 
granted, shareholder approval should be sought in advance as holding share options could be 
relevant to the determination of a non-executive director’s independence.  
 
3. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The limited research on INEDs’ remuneration is either prescriptive (e.g., Brown, 2007; Magnan 
et al, 2010) or descriptive (e.g., Hahn and Lasfer, 2011; Lazar et al, 2014). Among the few 
empirical studies which are not descriptive, most rely on an economic approach based on an 
optimal contracting perspective of agency theory in a single institutional setting1. Those studies 
have mainly focused on the adoption of performance-based remuneration to reduce the 
potentially misaligned interest between shareholders and INEDs (e.g., Hempel and Fay, 1994; 
Boyd, 1996; Bryan, Hwang, Klein  & Lilien , 2000; Cordeiro et al., 2000) or the adoption of 
                                                 
1
 To our knowledge the only empirical study that adopts an alternative social-psychological approach to investigate 
the determinants of INEDs’ remuneration is Marchetti and Stefanelli (2009). 
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meeting fees to provide INEDs with an incentive to exert more effort (Hempel and Fay 1994; 
Bryan et al. 2000; Brick, Palmon & Waldet, 2006; Farrell, Friesen & Hersch, 2008; Adams and 
Ferreira 2008). A more comprehensive agency theory framework was adopted by Cordeiro et al. 
(2000), Andreas et al. (2012) and Marchetti & Stefanelli (2009). These studies still rely on an 
optimal contracting perspective of agency theory, but consider not only firm performance and 
meeting fees as potential determinants of INEDs’ remuneration but also INEDs’ roles within the 
board and firm complexity.  
 
Not only is agency theory the most adopted theoretical framework in the previous, albeit scant, 
academic literature but agency theory tends to dominate the recommendations on board best 
practices in the various codes of corporate governance (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2010). Therefore, 
agency theory seems to provide an appropriate theoretical framework to investigate INEDs’ 
remuneration.    
 
Our study, in line with previous literature, develops its analysis focusing on the economic vision 
provided by agency theory. It extends previous literature by investigating agency theory from 
both an optimal contracting and a managerial power perspective in two very different 
institutional contexts – the UK and Italy. This choice allows us to deepen agency theory by 
complementing the economic approach provided by the optimal contracting view with a 
managerial power perspective, and to take into account whether the explicit manifestation and 
the ways to deal with agency problems vary depending on institutional context. 
 
Hypotheses’ development 
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Agency theory predicts that when dealing with non-programmable jobs where direct supervision 
is infeasible or counter-productive because of information asymmetries, i.e. when the agent has 
an information advantage over principals about the outcomes of his/her actions, it is efficient to 
write down a contract with payoffs that are based on outcomes that the principals can observe 
(Holmström, 1979). Hence, outcomes that can be measured more precisely and unequivocally 
can be expected to have greater influence over the distribution of rewards (Gomez-Mejia & 
Balkin, 1992). 
 
Following the logic of agency theory, in the board context the determination of INEDs’ 
remuneration, in particular the criteria by which INEDs are remunerated, is an important issue 
given the potential for agency problems between boards of directors and shareholders (Bebchuk 
et al., 2002; Certo et al., 2008; Andreas et al, 2012). INEDs’ work has low performance 
measurability, as the principal – the shareholders – is not likely to have the expertise to pass 
professional judgment on an INED's performance, given the extensive information asymmetries 
between the parties. The agency costs may be too high to allow the principal to monitor the 
quality of performance of an INED as an independent performance outcome. Hence, an INED’s 
remuneration may depend heavily on observable measures, such as the effort and responsibilities 
of an INED that are visible by shareholders, in lieu of monitoring the INED’s quality of 
performance.  
 
In the same vein, determining INEDs’ remuneration on the basis of their effort and 
responsibilities is in the interest of shareholders because firms that fail to do so would find it 
difficult to attract and retain talented directors (Hempel & Fay, 1994; Cordeiro et al., 2000). 
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Individuals seek to maintain an equilibrium between the inputs that they bring to a job and the 
outcomes they receive from it. Farrell et al. (2008) found that, contrary to the process for 
executive remuneration, INEDs’ remuneration is set for a group of individuals as a whole, i.e. 
INEDs’ remuneration is not designed based on the unique characteristics that a particular director 
brings to the board. According to this perspective, inter-directorial differences in remuneration 
may rather stem from taking on additional functions and responsibilities (e.g., chairmanship or 
committee membership) or variations in meeting attendance (Hempel & Fay, 1994; Brick et al., 
2006; Farrell et al., 2008; Marchetti & Stefanelli, 2009), although Cordeiro et al. (2000) found 
mixed evidence between outside (non-executive) director’s remuneration and measures of 
director’s effort. However overall we would expect that the effort that an INED expends is 
usually directly related to his/her responsibilities in the board (Linck et al., 2009; Engel, Hayes & 
Wang, 2010). Hence, we expect that:  
 
H1: INED’s remuneration will be positively related to the INED’s observable efforts and 
responsibilities. 
 
To pay INEDs considering the level of observable effort they exert and the responsibility they 
have on the board reflects an optimal contracting view. However, as in the case of CEO 
remuneration (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2002), firms may adopt different criteria in setting INEDs’ 
remuneration. The managerial power perspective (Bebchuk et al., 2002) starts with the 
recognition of an agency problem, and argues that just as there is no reason to assume that senior 
managers automatically seek to maximise shareholder value, there is no reason to expect that 
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directors will either. Managerial power arises when the board is not independent (Bebchuk et al., 
2002).  
 
Directors with a potential conflict of interest, such as those who have a significant business 
relationship with the company, a family relationship with corporate insiders, or interlocking 
board memberships with the CEO, may not act in a truly independent manner (Yermack, 2004). 
Such directors could collude with corporate insiders, i.e. a sub-set of shareholders (e.g., the 
controlling shareholder) or the executive directors, and help those insiders in pursing their own 
interests rather those of shareholders. In such cases, the managerial power perspective suggests 
that directors who provide generosity to the corporate insiders find the latter reciprocating 
(Bebchuk et al., 2002). Hence, directors’ remuneration might depend on whether they are, or are 
not, in a situation of conflict of interest with the firm, regardless of their effort and 
responsibilities in the board. The extent to which such directors are truly independent is central 
to the issue of whether they are able to exert an ‘objective independent judgment’ or not. The 
lack of real independence could facilitate the rise of corporate insiders’ power (Jensen, Murphy 
& Wruck, 2004). 
 
In the assessment of director’s independence, regulators have either adopted a ‘rules-based’ 
approach, by requiring companies to consider a non-executive director to be independent only 
when several formal criteria are met, or a ‘principles-based’ approach,  by giving companies the 
possibility of evaluating a director as independent even when s(he) does not meet all the formal 
independence criteria. In the latter case, the board of directors evaluates the independence of 
each director and is requested to explain situations where they deem a director as independent 
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even if the formal independence criteria are not fulfilled. The underlying logic reflects an optimal 
contracting view in that assessing independence as compliance with rules that define appropriate 
relationships undermines the link to ethical behaviour (Page & Spira, 2005). Thus, if 
relationships or circumstances do not, and are not likely to, affect the director’s judgement 
perhaps companies should not blindly apply the independence criteria (Karmel, 2014), as 
identified in the national corporate governance codes (Italian Code of Conduct, 2006, 2011; 
Combined Code, 2006; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012). In line with this perspective, it 
is assumed that boards will use this flexibility to use their professional judgment in determining 
whether to declare their directors as independent. 
 
However such flexibility, from a managerial power perspective (Bebchuk et al., 2002), 
provides the boards with an incentive to declare their directors as independent even when such 
an assessment might be considered dubious. In other words, the lack of fulfilment of the formal 
independence criteria set by the corporate governance codes (or other regulation) could affect the 
director’s actual independence, despite the company stating that the director is independent in 
character and judgement. INEDs who have an interest at stake may behave differently from those 
who are fully independent because whilst they are deemed to be formally independent, in reality 
they may not be. Those INEDs may act in the interests of corporate insiders, collude with the 
CEO (or the controlling shareholder) and exercise their monitoring duties less efficiently (Melis, 
2005; Clark, Wójcik & Bauer, 2006). 
 
Hence, according to a managerial power view, such INEDs may be paid significantly 
more than INEDs who do meet all the independence criteria, regardless of their level of visible 
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effort and responsibilities, as a result of their lack of actual independence and potential to collude 
with corporate insiders.  
 
H2: INED’s remuneration will be negatively associated with the fulfilment of the 
independence criteria stated in the corporate governance codes.  
 
4. Research methodology 
4.1. Sample and data  
In order to analyze INEDs’ remuneration a sample composed of Italian and UK non-financial 
companies listed respectively on the Milan Stock Exchange and on the London Stock Exchange 
in the period 2007-2009 was selected. As firm size (Hempel & Fay, 1994; Boyd, 1996; Marchetti 
& Stefanelli, 2009; Andreas et al., 2012) and industry (Ely, 1991) are likely to affect directors’ 
remuneration, the sample was selected so that UK and Italian firms were not significantly 
different from each other in terms of industry and size. By using a stratified random procedure 
the population is first divided into a number of parts or strata according to some characteristics, 
chosen to be related to the major variables being studied. 
 
There were 235 Italian non-financial firms and 1557 non-financial UK firms listed in 2007, 2008 
and 2009. Firms whose financial year-end was not the end of December  were eliminated from 
the analysis, to ensure comparability of the results, leaving 220 Italian firms and 667 UK firms. 
Inside each of the two groups, the listed companies were stratified according to two-digit SIC 
industry code and market capitalization (as a proxy for firm size) at 31st December 2008. At this 
stage we had 220 potential pairs. After the matching procedure of each Italian firm with a UK 
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firm with the same two-digit SIC code, and a similar market capitalization, 92 potential pairs had 
to be dropped, leaving 128 potential pairs. Then we eliminated companies that did not disclose 
any information about INEDs’ remuneration or did not have any INEDs who served the firm 
throughout the whole financial year. A pair was eliminated from the sample only if both 
companies fell into at least one of those situations. If only one of the companies of the pair fell 
into at least one of the above mentioned situations we looked for another firm to match. This 
procedure led to a final sample composed of 91 Italian non-financial listed firms and 91 UK non-
financial listed firms, with 546 firms’ year observations and a total of 1733 INEDs’ year 
observations. 
 
Data on INEDs’ remuneration, age, efforts and responsibilities, and board evaluation were hand-
collected from companies’ annual reports and corporate governance reports. Data on INEDs’ 
previous directorships were gathered from Thomson One Banker as were the data on firm’s 
market capitalization and industry. Finally, firm’s performance measures and financial leverage 
data were gathered from the Amadeus database. 
 
4.2. Data analysis methods 
The basis and the amounts of INEDs’ remuneration were analysed by using descriptive statistics 
tools. In order to test our hypotheses we estimated a series of three-level hierarchical linear 
regression models with INEDs’ remuneration as the dependent variable. We employed a multi-
level hierarchical linear model with random intercept and random slope, as our sample is 
characterized by the presence of annual observations for each director (j,t) nested within 
directors (j), which in turn are nested within firms (i). The multilevel hierarchical linear model 
relates our control factors (cj,i,t), and our independent variables of interest (Effortj,i,t and 
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Independencej,i,t) to the remuneration of the INED j in firm i at time t (Remunerationj,i,t), by 
controlling for fixed-year effects (λt), for firm-level random effects u(1)i, and director-level 
random effects u(2)j,i. Following previous studies (e.g. Hutzschenreuter, Lewin & Dresel, 2011; 
Merchant, 2012; Nicholson & Salaber, 2013) we estimated our cross-sectional regressions 
separately for Italian and UK firms. 
 
(1) tijjijittijtijtijtij jii uZuZcceIndependenEffortonRemunerati ,,
)2()2(
,
)1()1(
,,,,,2,,10,,
,
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At this stage, four INEDs’ year observations were dropped as their remuneration was equal to 
zero. To check for multicollinearity we verified the level of correlation among the independent 
variables and the variance inflation factors (VIFs). 
 
4.3. Variables 
4.3.1. Dependent variable.  
Following previous studies (e.g., Marchetti & Stefanelli, 2009, Andreas et al 2012), our 
dependent variable (Remuneration) is the natural logarithm of the total remuneration received by 
an INED during a financial year (2), measured as the sum of total fees and performance-related 
pay (3) (used by some companies although not recognised as best practice).  
 
4.3.2. Independent variables.  
                                                 
2
 The logarithm of the remuneration is used to reduce the level of heteroscedasticity in the dependent variable (e.g., Marchetti & 
Stefanelli, 2009; Fernandes et al, 2013).   
3
 Performance-related pay is equal to the sum of cash bonuses and gains realized from the exercise of share options or the award 
of shares.   
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The amount of effort and responsibility that is observable to shareholders is likely to depend on 
the different tasks INEDs are required to do. Following previous literature (Hempel & Fay, 1994; 
Cordeiro et al., 2000; Brick et al., 2006; Farrell et al., 2008; Marchetti & Stefanelli, 2009; Engel 
et al., 2010), director’s observable effort and responsibilities were measured as follows:  
- “Chair”, a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the INED is the Chair of the Board during the 
financial year, and 0 otherwise 
- “SID” (Senior Independent Director), a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the INED serves 
as SID during the financial year, and 0 otherwise  
- “Committees”, number of board committees the INED sits on during the financial year; 
- “Committees' chair”, number of  board committees chaired by the INED during the financial 
year.  
- “Board attendance”, number of board meetings attended by the INED during the financial year.  
 
The presence of INEDs’ potential conflicts of interest was estimated by considering whether 
firms abide by the corporate governance codes’ formal criteria to assess non-executive directors’ 
independence. The variable “Independence” is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the INED 
fulfilled all the independence criteria stated by the Corporate Governance Code, and 0 otherwise. 
 
4.3.3. Control variables. 
- “Firm size”, measured as the natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm at the end of the 
year t-1. Larger firms are likely to be characterized by more complex activities with larger stakes 
involved (Bryan et al., 2000; Brick et al., 2006; Andreas et al., 2012).  
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- “Financial leverage”, measured as the ratio between the value of total debts and total assets at 
the end of the year t-1. The level of debt could influence the firm’s need to select INEDs for 
monitoring executives and top management (Williamson, 1988; Brick et al., 2006).  
- “Board evaluation”, measured as 1 if the company conducts a board evaluation, and 0 
otherwise. A formal board evaluation process aimed at evaluating whether directors are 
performing their duties efficiently could influence the level of INEDs’ remuneration (Marchetti 
& Stefanelli, 2009). In accordance with the results of the board evaluation process, INEDs could 
be rewarded/punished with an increase/decrease in their remuneration.  
- “Firm Performance”, measured as Total Shareholder Return. INEDs in firms that achieved 
higher performance in the market are likely to receive higher pay than those of firms whose 
performance was lower (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). 
- “Firm compliance”, measured as 1 if the firm complied with the corporate governance codes 
for all INEDs, and 0 otherwise. It is used to control if a firm was compliant with the corporate 
governance codes formal independence criteria with respect to all INEDs.  
- “INEDs’ directorships”, number of positions previously held as director in other companies, as 
INEDs with many directorships will have a strong  expertise that will help him/her in performing 
better his/her activity, hence s(he) will be paid more (Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen, 2001). 
- “INEDs’ age”, measured as the natural logarithm of the INEDs’ age. It proxies as a general 
level of experience (Hogan & McPheters, 1980; Marchetti & Stefanelli, 2009). 
- “Industry”, measured as a set of dichotomous variables which equal 1 if the firm operated in the 
i one-digit sic and 0 otherwise. Director’s remuneration may reflect a need to conform to market 
expectations which could be predicted by examining industry traditions or peer references 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2003).  
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- “Year”, as a set of dichotomous variables which equal 1 if the remuneration refers to the i year 
(i = 2007, 2008, 2009) and 0 otherwise. Used in order to control for year-effect.  
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Univariate analysis 
The descriptive statistics for INEDs’ remuneration are shown in Table 2. The 2007-2009 INEDs’ 
remuneration trends are similar for Italy and the UK as they show a gradual increase from 2007 
to 2009. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
The median and mean remuneration values are significantly higher in UK firms than in Italian 
firms (€63,073 vs. €42.853, p<0.01). This difference may be attributed to differences in efforts 
and responsibilities between INEDs in the UK and Italy. More specifically, the average level of 
effort and responsibilities of INEDs is significantly higher in UK firms than in Italian ones as 
UK INEDs sit on (and chair) a higher number of board committees, and are more frequently the 
Chair of the board or the SID (see Table 3). This disparity in role may be a consequence of the 
differences that exist between the two corporate systems in terms of relevance of the agency 
problem between executives and shareholders as well as overall development of the corporate 
governance best practices. Indeed, because of the presence of a controlling shareholder who is 
able to directly monitor executive directors, INEDs may have to exert less effort and have less 
responsibilities in Italian firms than in UK firms. Indeed, as also recognized by the Italian Code 
of Corporate Governance, the setting up of a nomination committee is not as important in Italy as 
in UK firms as potential candidates are usually chosen by the controlling shareholder in Italy. 
Moreover, in contrast to the UK where the Code of Corporate Governance recommends all listed 
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firms to appoint a SID, in Italy such a recommendation is only directed to firms with either a 
dual CEO/Chair or a Chair who is also the controlling shareholder. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Panel B in Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics at firm level. It shows that, compared to the 
UK firms, Italian firms are significantly more indebted and significantly more of them adopt the 
formal criteria stated by the national Corporate Governance Code in assessing directors’ 
independence. In contrast, they are less likely to conduct board evaluations and recorded lower 
stock market performance. 
 
Table 4 reports the correlations between all the variables used in the analysis for Italian firms 
(Panel A) and UK firms (Panel B).The first column in these tables reports the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) for each explanatory variable. VIF values are low and the independent variables 
do not have correlations with each other greater than |0.6|, thus multicollinearity is unlikely to be 
a concern. As shown in Table 4, in both countries, INEDs’ remuneration (our dependent variable) 
is positively and significantly correlated (p<0.01) with the number of board meetings attended by 
INEDs, INEDs’ age, firm size and financial leverage, the implementation of a board evaluation, 
and the public utilities industry. In Italy only, INEDs’ remuneration is also positively and 
significantly correlated (p<0.01) with the number of committees on which INEDs sit and the 
number of those they chair, as well as with INEDs’ abidance by the corporate governance codes’ 
formal independence criteria and the firm’s compliance with the corporate governance code. In 
the UK, INEDs’ remuneration is positively and significantly correlated  (p<0.01) with the 
chairperson position and the INEDs’ previous directorships. On the contrary, it is negatively and 
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significantly correlated (p<0.01) with the number of committees on which INEDs sit. This 
counter-intuitive finding is due to the fact that in the UK, chairpersons - who are paid 
significantly more than other INEDs - rarely sit on board committees. Indeed, as shown in the 
panel B of Table 4, in the UK the variables ‘Chair’ and ‘Committee’ are negatively and 
significantly correlated  (p<0.01).  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
 
5.2. Multivariate analysis 
Table 5 reports the results of regression analysis for each country. For each country two models 
have been developed. In model 1 we included all INEDs, while in model 2 we excluded the 
INEDs who chaired the board. We excluded Chairs for the following reasons: firstly in the UK, 
the Chair’s independence has to be evaluated differently from other INEDs, thus we need to 
exclude them in order to test hypothesis 2; secondly Chairs are usually paid significantly more 
than other non-executive directors and usually are less involved in the board’s committees, thus 
the results could be affected by their inclusion in the sample. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
In both countries (see models 1 and 2 for Italy and models 3 and 4 for the UK in Table 5) the 
variables ‘Chairperson’, ‘SID’, and ‘Board attendance’ are positively and significantly related to 
INEDs’ remuneration. This suggests that both UK and Italian firms design INEDs’ remuneration 
by taking into account the roles which INEDs cover (as Chairperson or SID) and the effort they 
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exert, in terms of number of board meetings they attended during the year. A significant 
difference between the UK and Italian firms emerges in the importance that committee positions 
have in determining the amount of INEDs’ remuneration. In particular, the variable ‘Committees’ 
has a positive and significant influence on INEDs’ remuneration in Italian firms, but not in the 
UK firms (see Table 5). By contrast, the variable ‘Committees chair’ is positively and 
significantly related to INEDs’ remuneration in the UK firms, whilst having a positive, albeit not 
significant, influence in the Italian firms. These findings suggest that positions held by an INED 
on the board’s committees influence INEDs’ remuneration differently in the two countries. In 
Italy, INEDs are paid significantly more in accordance with the number of committees they sit 
on, while in the UK a higher remuneration is given to an INED according to the number of 
committees s/he chairs. Despite these differences, our findings show that in both countries 
INEDs’ remuneration is positively and significantly related to INEDs’ effort and responsibilities. 
Thus, H1 is supported. 
 
On the other hand, H2 is supported, but only in the UK. Whilst we find that in both countries the 
variable ‘independence’ is negatively related to INEDs’ remuneration, this relation is only 
statistically significant in the UK sample (see model 4). Thus in the UK, INEDs who do fulfil all 
the formal independence criteria stated by the Corporate Governance Code are paid significantly 
less than INEDs who do not.  
 
In line with the descriptive statistics, multivariate analysis shows that in both countries INEDs’ 
remuneration was significantly higher in 2009, as the coefficient of the variable year 2009 is 
positive and significant.  We also find that, in both countries, INEDs with a greater expertise, in 
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terms of previously-held directorships, are paid significantly more, as well as those who served 
on the boards of larger firms and/or on the boards of firms which belong to the public utilities 
industry. In Italy INEDs’ remuneration is also significantly higher in more indebted firms.  
 
5.3. Robustness tests  
We performed a number of additional analyses to support the robustness of our results.  
First, we run all the regression models by considering only the fixed remuneration received by 
INEDs as the dependent variable. Results are consistent with those reported in Table 5. Second, 
we repeat our analysis using year-by-year annual data. For each year we obtain results 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5. Third, to control for abnormal remuneration we 
run all the regression models by excluding INEDs whose remuneration was above the 99 
percentile and under the 1 percentile. Results are consistent with those reported in Table 5. 
Fourth, in relation to the overall sample, because there was a lack of disclosure on some issues, 
in particular the number of board meetings INEDs attended during the company’s financial year  
(see Table 3), we were not able to estimate all the independent variables for each observation. 
Therefore, we performed all the previous regression models by considering the independent 
variables that we were able to estimate for each of the 1733 observations. Results are consistent 
with the findings reported earlier. Finally, we performed an interactive regression model (4) that 
allows us to take into account the potential moderating role of country-level factors on the 
relationship between INEDs’ remuneration and our measures of (i) INEDs’ effort and 
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Where: Country equals 1 if the firm operates in Italy and 0 otherwise.   
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responsibilities and (ii) INEDs’ abidance by the corporate governance codes’ formal 
independence criteria. We find that country-level factors have an influence on the relationship 
between INEDs’ remuneration and his(her) observable effort and responsibilities, in terms of 
committee membership, as its influence on INEDs’ remuneration is significantly stronger in Italy 
than in the UK. We do not find any significant difference between the two countries on the 
influence played by the other variables used to estimate INEDs’ effort and responsibilities and 
INEDs’ remuneration. Moreover, in line with the findings reported in Table 5, we find that the 
negative influence between INEDs’ abidance by the corporate governance codes’ formal 
independence criteria and their remuneration is significantly stronger in the UK than in Italy.  
 
6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
This study contributes to the understanding of INEDs’ remuneration by adopting an 
agency theory framework. In particular, it analyses the extent to which both optimal contracting 
theory and managerial power perspectives of agency theory are able to explain INEDs’ 
remuneration in two different institutional contexts, the UK and Italy, by investigating whether  
INEDs’ remuneration reflects INEDs’ effort and responsibilities that are observable by 
shareholders and/or INEDs’ potential conflicts of interest. Our findings provide support for the 
view, previously brought to light in executive remuneration studies, that optimal contracting and 
managerial power perspectives do not necessarily represent competing explanations but ‘points 
on a continuum of types of contracting arrangements that can be encompassed within agency 
theory’ (Van Essen et al., 2014: 24). 
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We show that INEDs’ remuneration is mainly based on the observable effort they exert 
and their responsibilities within the board (e.g., board meeting attendance, role of chairperson of 
the board or of senior independent director). This supports an optimal contracting view of agency 
theory (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). INEDs’ performance is an extremely difficult area 
for the principals (the shareholders) to measure and observe. In contrast, INEDs 
formal/functional roles within the board (e.g. chairpersonship, committee membership etc.) as 
well as their official participation in the board activities (e.g. board meeting attendance) represent 
informative proxies of the level of effort and responsibilities effectively exerted, as they are 
unequivocal and observable by the shareholders. This finding is in line with agency theory at it 
suggests that when direct monitoring is infeasible it is efficient to base the agent’s (INEDs) 
remuneration on outcomes that the principals can observe (Holmström, 1979). Moreover  this  is 
consistent with what is considered as best practice in the corporate governance codes (e.g., 
Italian Code of Conduct, 2011, UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012), which are themselves 
strongly influenced by agency theory (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2010).  
 
Our study also reveals that INEDs are paid more when they do not fulfil all of the 
independence criteria stated by the corporate governance codes, after controlling for their 
observable effort and responsibilities, than those who do fulfil these criteria. The Italian and the 
UK Codes of Corporate Governance share the assumption that boards will use their professional 
judgment, independently from their directors, in determining whether to declare a director as 
independent, even when s/he does not meet all the independence criteria. Despite this underlying 
assumption, we find that such behaviour appears to be interpretable with the managerial power 
lens.  This is because it seems to be associated with a potential collusion between such INEDs 
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and the corporate insiders rather than the result of an effective and objective board test of 
independence which uses the discretion given to improve corporate governance. According to a 
managerial power perspective, directors with a potential conflict of interest (such as those who 
do not fulfil all of the independence criteria stated by the Codes of Corporate Governance) might 
collude with corporate insiders and help them in pursing their own interest rather those of 
shareholders. In such cases, directors who provide generosity to the corporate insiders find the 
latter reciprocating (Bebchuk et al., 2002).  
 
This finding extends the literature on the managerial power perspective of agency theory, 
previously mainly focused on executive remuneration (e.g., Bebchuk et al, 2002; Van Essen, et 
al, 2014), by providing new insights on INEDs’ remuneration. It also contributes to the existing 
regulatory debate about the choice of either a statutory regime or a flexible system on some 
governance issues (McNeil & Li, 2006; Arcot, Bruno & Faure-Grimaud, 2010; Fasterling, 2012), 
by providing new insights on the risks associated with a flexible system on the key corporate 
governance issue of INEDs. Moreover, by highlighting the potential implications of assessing 
directors’ independence as compliance with rules, our study has attempted to answer the call of 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) for more careful examination of the content of the codes of 
corporate governance to help understand the soundness, or otherwise, of their recommendations. 
 
Our study provides a number of contributions to the International Business literature. 
This study provides empirical evidence on the level and composition of INEDs’ remuneration in 
listed firms that operate in two European countries, whilst the previous literature has mainly 
focused on US firms. Moreover, it contributes to understanding whether agency theory can be 
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applied to very different institutional contexts (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1988; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; 
Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 2007; Aguilera et al., 2008; Wiseman et al., 2012) and whether the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms predicted by agency theory are affected by 
institutional considerations (e.g., Bowe et al, 2010; Van Essen et al, 2012; Wiseman et al., 2012). 
The results show similarities between Italy and the UK in the limited use of performance-based 
remuneration for INEDs, but significant differences in terms of the amount paid. The very 
limited use of performance-based remuneration, which is in accordance with the good practices 
recommended by the Italian and UK Corporate Governance Codes, contrasts with the US 
evidence (Bhagat, Carey & Elson, 1999; Cordeiro et al., 2000; Williams, 2005; Engel et al., 
2010) where performance-based remuneration is highly diffused.  
 
This significant difference could be attributed to the belief, shared by Italy and the UK, 
that performance-based remuneration could be detrimental for directors’ independence (Italian 
Code of Conduct, 2006; 2011; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012), a view which contrasts 
with the US underlying assumption that performance-based remuneration can reduce the agency 
problems between INEDs and shareholders by providing the former an incentive to effectively 
monitor executive directors (e.g., Shen, 2005). This pattern is consistent with the empirical 
studies on CEO remuneration which find a divide between US and European firms’ practices 
(e.g., Conyon & Murphy 2000; Fernandes et al., 2013).   
 
We also find that UK firms paid their INEDs significantly more than Italian firms. 
Country-level institutional differences between Italy and the UK might provide an explanation 
for this finding, as they can affect both the overall amount paid and the INEDs role. The higher 
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remuneration paid to INEDs by UK firms may be attributable to the fact that UK firms are more 
exposed to US financial influence than Italian firms and US influence tends to increase 
remuneration (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2005). In addition, in contrast with the UK, Italy is 
characterized by listed firms with a more concentrated ownership structure and a higher debt 
ratio. These characteristics increase the monitoring undertaken by (controlling) shareholders and 
creditors. Therefore, INEDs might have to exert less effort and have fewer responsibilities in 
Italian firms than in UK firms. This in turn leads to a clear contrast with the higher INEDs’ 
remuneration in the UK. Moreover, INEDs’ reputational risks and personal liabilities are also 
influenced by the institutional context. In the UK, according to the Companies Act (2006), 
directors can be held personally liable for breach of duties and equal liabilities exist between 
executive directors and INEDs. By contrast, in Italy INEDs’ liabilities are significantly lower as 
the 2004 Company Reform attributes most of them to executive directors. In addition, the UK is 
characterised by a higher level of legal protection of minority shareholders and a significant role 
played by takeovers (La Porta et al. 1997). Given that INEDs could require an increase in 
remuneration to offset the risks associated with exposure to potential liabilities, litigation costs 
and consequent higher responsibility (Linck et al., 2009; Aguir et al., 2013), this significant 
difference in INEDs’ reputational risks and personal liabilities may explain why INEDs are paid 
significantly more in the UK than in Italy. 
 
Despite such institutional differences, we found that the general criteria used by firms in 
the two countries to set INEDs’ remuneration are largely the same. Both Italian and UK firms 
pay INEDs on the basis of their observable effort and responsibilities, although some differences 
do exist on the influence that the specific type of effort and responsibilities have in determining 
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the amount of INEDs’ remuneration. The essential agency problem seems to remain in both 
contexts because information asymmetry between shareholders and INEDs exists both in Italy 
and in the UK. INEDs always have more information than shareholders because of their 
proximity to the tasks and responsibilities to which they are assigned. To monitor agents’ 
behaviour by basing INEDs’ remuneration on their observable effort and responsibilities reflects 
a concern in any relationship that involves delegation (Gomez-Meja & Wiseman, 2007), 
especially in a non-programmable job context, where direct supervision is infeasible. However, 
the different importance that is placed on committee positions and the presence of INEDs’ 
potential conflicts of interest in determining the amount of INEDs’ remuneration reveals that 
even though agency problems remain in both contexts, the explicit manifestation of these 
problems and ways to deal with them may vary depending on the institutional context (Wiseman 
et al., 2012). Therefore, our study supports the argument that agency theory should be 
complemented with an institution-based view. 
 
As with any study, this one is not without its limitations. Firstly we examine INEDs’ 
remuneration in two countries only and whilst the choice of Italy and the UK assured adequate 
between-country variation, enabling us to leverage the generalisability of the findings, a more 
comprehensive picture would be obtained by further study of additional countries. Secondly our 
dataset covers the period 2007-2009, future studies could encompass later periods.  While these 
considerations impose some limitations on the interpretation of our results, they also offer 
exciting opportunities for future research in the area of INEDs’ remuneration which is still 
considerably under-investigated. 
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In spite of these limitations, this study nonetheless provides valuable insights and has a 
number of relevant practical and policymaking implications. First of all, our finding that firms 
rely on measures of effort and responsibilities that are observable to shareholders, rather than 
monitoring the INED’s quality of performance as an independent performance outcome, provides 
new insights to practitioners when designing INEDs’ remuneration. These new insights are 
important given that designing INEDs’ remuneration is a job where direct supervision by 
principals is either not feasible or counter-productive. Second, our finding on the presence of 
potential collusion between INEDs and the corporate insiders when best practices are not fully 
enforced offers a new awareness to policymakers. It  casts some doubt on the effectiveness of 
adopting non-binding criteria in order to assess non-executive directors’ independence. It also 
leaves us with the important question of the extent to which INEDs can be relied on as an 
effective corporate governance mechanism and a measure of corporate governance quality 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Fich, 2005; Mura, 2007). This in turn also has important ramifications 
as it leads to questions about the effectiveness of other corporate governance devices which are 
expected to work on the basis of the assumed independence of directors (e.g., key board 
committees such as the audit/remuneration committees). Overall, this study extends the scant 
literature on INEDs’ remuneration and its determinants and provides a contribution to the 
solution of the “enigma” of INEDs’ remuneration.  
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Table 1 – Definition of independence according to the Italian and the UK Corporate 
Governance Codes 
 
ITALIAN CODE OF CONDUCT UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 
 
Relationships or circumstances relevant to evaluate director independence include whether 
the director: 
 
controls…the issuer [even] through subsidiaries, trustees, 
or…third party…;  
represents a significant shareholder 
 is, or has been in the preceding three fiscal years, a 
relevant representative of the issue…; 
has…a significant commercial, financial or professional 
relationship [with the issuer]…; 
 has, or has had within the last three years, a material 
business relationship with the company either directly, 
or as a partner, shareholder, 
director or senior employee of a body that has such a 
relationship with the company; 
receives a significant additional remuneration [from the 
issuer]…; 
has received or receives additional remuneration from 
the company apart from a director’s fee, participates in 
the company’s share option or a performance-related 
pay scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension 
scheme; 
was a director of the issuer for more than nine years in 
the last twelve years…; 
 has served on the board for more than nine years from 
the date of their first election. 
is vested with the executive director office in another 
company in which an executive director of the issuer 
holds the office of director; 
holds cross-directorships or has significant links with 
other directors through involvement in other 
companies or bodies; 
 is [a] shareholder or quotaholder or director of [an] 
entity belonging to the same network as the company 
appointed for the accounting audit of the issuer; 
 
is a close relative of a person [above]…. has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, 
directors or senior employees; 
 
 40 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of INEDs’ remuneration (in euros) in 2007-2009 
  Obs Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev. 
2007 ITA 284 41,096 30,000 1,000 178,000 35,211 
UK 286 59,400 48,074 - 522,488 51,024 
2008 ITA 281 41,590 30,500 1,000 173,000 34,618 
UK 284 64,036 49,327 - 569,296 56,125 
2009 ITA 291 45,786 34,500 2,080 368,179 41,731 
UK 307 65,605 51,569 - 569,296 55,919 
Total period 
ITA 856 42,853 31,000 1,000 368,179 37,390 
UK 877 63,073 50,605 - 569,296 54,442 
 
Notes: UK INEDs’ remuneration was converted to Euros using purchasing power parity (PPP) (OECD, 2011). PPP 
rate Euro/Pound: 1.2651 calculated at December of 2007. 
 
OECD (2011), Prices and purchasing power parities (PPP), http://www.oecd.org/std/prices-ppp/ 
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 Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for INED characteristics 
  ITA UK 
Difference of means   No obs Mean Std. Dev. No obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Chair 856 0.01 0.18 877 0.10 0.2975 -0.09 *** 
Committees  856 1.49 0.94 877 2.53 0.73 -1.04 *** 
Committees’ chair 856 0.32 0.57 877 0.72 0.64 -0.40 *** 
SID 856 0.12 0.33 877 0.23 0.42 -0.11 *** 
Board attendance 772 8.02 4.11 763 8.33 2.46 -0.31 * 
INED’s directorships (a) 856 1.99 2.06 877 2.24 2.44 -0.25 ** 
INED’s age (a) 853 59.50 11.31 870 58.85 7.15 -0.65 * 
Independence 856 0.88 0.32 877 0.85 0.36  0.03 ** 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for firm characteristics  
  ITA UK 
Difference of means   No Obs Mean Std. Dev. No obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Firm size (a) (b) 273 4,261 16,700 273 2,803 16,800 1,457  
Financial leverage 273 0.60 0.18 273 0.53 0.26 0.07 *** 
Board evaluation 273 0.50 0.50 273 0.68 0.47 -0.18 *** 
Firm performance  269 -0.12 0.47 269 -0.04 0.50 -0.08 * 
Firm compliance 273 0.73 0.44 273 0.59 0.49 0.14 *** 
  
Notes: 
(a) Descriptive statistics are calculated without the logarithm; (b) Firm size is expressed in millions of Euros. 
Legend: * Significance at 10% level; ** Significance at 5% level; *** Significance at 1% level 
 42 
 
Table 4 – Pearson correlation matrix  
  
VIF 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 17 
 
18 
 
19 
 
20 
Panel A: Italy  
                                      1 Remuneration  1 
                                     2 Chair 1.10 -0.02 
 
1 
                                   3 Committees 1.29 0.20 *** -0.07 ** 1 
                                 4 Committees' chair 1.29 0.11 *** -0.05 
 
0.33 *** 1 
                               5 SID 1.27 0.05 
 
-0.04 
 
0.23 *** 0.37 *** 1 
                             6 Board attendance 1.44 0.51 *** -0.01 
 
0.12 *** 0.10 *** -0.05 
 
1 
                           7 Independence  1.80 0.21 *** -0.14 *** 0.14 *** 0.08 ** 0.03 
 
0.20 *** 1 
                         8 Firm size 1.12 0.62 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.05 
 
-0.10 *** 0.39 *** 0.06 * 1 
                       9 Financial leverage 1.31 0.33 *** -0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.08 ** -0.04 
 
0.25 *** 0.20 *** 0.28 *** 1 
                     10 Board evaluation 1.92 0.28 *** 0.04 
 
-0.10 *** 0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
0.09 ** 0.07 * 0.42 *** 0.17 *** 1 
                   11 Firm performance 1.23 -0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.07 ** -0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
0.01 
 
0.06 
 
0.06 * -0.04 
 
-0.06 * 1 
                 12 Firm compliance 1.31 0.15 *** -0.08 ** 0.17 *** 0.12 *** 0.10 *** 0.08 ** 0.57 *** -0.13 *** 0.17 *** -0.02 
 
0.03 
 
1 
               13 INED’s age 1.90 0.13 *** 0.12 *** -0.03 
 
-0.01 
 
0.05 
 
0.03 
 
-0.18 *** 0.11 *** -0.01 
 
0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.13 *** 1 
             14 INED’s directorship 2.13 0.01 
 
-0.05 
 
0.02 
 
0.09 *** 0.08 ** -0.16 *** -0.18 *** 0.13 *** -0.01 
 
0.13 *** 0.00 
 
-0.18 *** 0.13 *** 1 
           15 year 2008 1.54 -0.02 
 
0.00 
 
0.04 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
-0.07 * 0.00 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
0.08 ** 0.02 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
1 
         16 year 2009 2.53 0.05 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
0.06 * 0.10 *** 0.08 ** -0.60 *** -0.04 
 
0.04 
 
0.01 
 
-0.50 *** 1 
       17 Light manufacturing 1.70 -0.07 ** 0.05 
 
-0.10 *** -0.08 ** -0.08 ** 0.01 
 
-0.22 *** 0.06 * -0.05 
 
0.10 *** -0.06 * -0.34 *** 0.01 
 
0.09 *** 0.00 
 
0.03 1 
      18 Heavy manufacturing 1.92 0.05 
 
-0.06 * 0.17 *** 0.07 ** 0.19 *** -0.06 
 
0.00 
 
0.05 
 
0.03 
 
0.01 
 
0.03 
 
-0.17 *** 0.14 *** 0.16 *** -0.01 
 
0.01 -0.25 *** 1 
    19 Public Utilities 1.92 0.31 *** 0.06 * -0.09 ** -0.04 
 
-0.12 *** 0.29 *** 0.12 *** 0.32 *** 0.06 * 0.21 *** -0.01 
 
0.24 *** -0.01 
 
-0.31 *** 0.02 
 
-0.02 -0.15 *** -0.27 *** 1 
  20 Services 1.50 -0.07 ** 0.03 
 
0.08 ** 0.08 ** 0.07 ** -0.04 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.24 *** 0.07 * -0.09 *** -0.12 *** 0.05 
 
-0.06 
 
0.05 
 
0.00 
 
-0.01 -0.16 *** -0.28 *** -0.17 *** 1 
    VIF 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   14   15   16 17   18   19   20 
 
Panel B: UK  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  1 Remuneration  1 
                                     2 Chair 1.18 0.50 *** 1 
                                   3 Committees 1.16 -0.10 *** -0.16 *** 1 
                                 4 Committees' chair 1.29 0.04 
 
0.12 *** 0.22 *** 1 
                               5 SID 1.31 -0.04 
 
-0.14 *** 0.22 *** 0.35 *** 1 
                             6 Board attendance 1.28 0.17 *** 0.08 ** 0.09 ** 0.03 
 
0.04 
 
1 
                           7 Independence  1.40 0.04 
 
-0.07 * 0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.08 ** 0.11 *** 1 
                         8 Firm size 1.20 0.47 *** -0.07 * 0.09 *** -0.12 *** 0.04 
 
0.17 *** 0.13 *** 1 
                       9 Financial leverage 1.28 0.15 *** -0.01 
 
0.05 
 
0.02 
 
0.07 ** 0.15 *** 0.10 *** 0.25 *** 1 
                     10 Board evaluation 1.48 0.19 *** -0.09 *** 0.10 *** -0.08 ** 0.14 *** 0.26 *** 0.11 *** 0.48 *** 0.22 *** 1 
                   11 Firm performance 1.44 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
0.04 
 
0.01 
 
0.03 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.04 
 
1 
                 12 Firm compliance 1.24 -0.04 
 
-0.02 
 
0.08 ** -0.03 
 
0.02 
 
0.17 *** 0.49 *** -0.08 ** 0.05 
 
0.02 
 
-0.04 
 
1 
               13 INED’s age 1.63 0.14 *** 0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
0.07 ** 0.17 *** -0.05 
 
-0.20 *** 0.17 *** 0.02 
 
0.17 *** 0.03 
 
-0.12 *** 1 
             14 INED’s directorship 1.60 0.27 *** 0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.15 *** 0.27 *** 0.00 
 
0.33 *** 0.11 *** 0.21 *** -0.01 
 
-0.03 
 
0.14 *** 1 
           15 year 2008 1.53 0.01 
 
0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
-0.10 *** 0.00 
 
0.02 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.02 
 
0.06 * 0.00 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
1 
         16 year 2009 2.16 0.03 
 
0.01 
 
0.03 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
0.06 
 
0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
0.05 
 
0.04 
 
-0.54 *** 0.02 
 
0.05 
 
0.05 
 
-0.51 *** 1 
       17 Light manufacturing 1.81 0.04 
 
0.04 
 
-0.08 ** -0.05 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
-0.16 *** 0.09 *** -0.10 *** 0.11 *** -0.04 
 
-0.34 *** 0.00 
 
-0.05 
 
0.00 
 
-0.01 1 
      18 Heavy manufacturing 2.20 -0.02 
 
0.00 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.08 ** -0.02 
 
0.12 *** 0.06 * -0.05 
 
-0.25 *** 0.13 *** 0.09 ** 0.21 *** 0.09 *** 0.12 *** 0.00 
 
0.00 -0.32 *** 1 
    19 Public Utilities 1.73 0.27 *** 0.00 
 
0.09 *** 0.02 
 
-0.05 
 
0.03 
 
0.06 * 0.29 *** 0.19 *** 0.00 
 
0.01 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
0.16 *** 0.00 
 
0.01 -0.18 *** -0.30 *** 1 
  20 Services 1.52 -0.12 *** -0.06 * 0.00 
 
0.06 * 0.02 
 
-0.08 ** 0.06 * -0.28 *** 0.19 *** -0.25 *** -0.03 
 
0.14 *** 0.02 
 
-0.07 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 -0.18 *** -0.29 *** -0.17 *** 1 
 
Notes: Legend: * Significance at 10% level; ** Significance at 5% level; *** Significance at 1% level 
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Table 5 – Results on the association between INEDs’ remuneration (dependent variable) 
and INEDs effort, responsibilities and potential conflict of interest.  
 
 ITALY UK 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Chair 4.38 *** 19.08 *** 
Committees 6.47 *** 6.60 *** -3.79 *** 1.61 
Committees' chair 0.93 
 
0.93 
 
2.79 *** 2.47 *** 
SID 2.17 ** 2.16 ** 0.04 
 
1.71 ** 
Board attendance 3.75 *** 3.65 *** -0.41 
 
1.73 ** 
Independence    -0.48 
 
  -2.15 ** 
Firm size 2.03 ** 1.97 ** 6.19 *** 5.61 *** 
Financial leverage 3.15 *** 3.12 *** -0.11 
 
0.37 
 Board evaluation 2.62 *** 2.62 *** 0.45 -0.31 
Firm performance -0.48 -0.37 -0.60 
 
-0.10 
 Firm compliance 1.40 
 
1.39 
 
0.62 
 
0.00 
 INED’s age 1.28 1.20 2.37 ** 1.49 
INED’s directorships 2.05 ** 1.95 * 2.08 ** 1.69 ** 
year 2008 1.08 
 
1.17 
 
0.90 2.14 ** 
year 2009 1.72 * 1.77 * 0.86 2.14 ** 
Light manufacturing 0.40 0.44 0.86 
 
1.67 * 
Heavy manufacturing 0.62 
 
0.66 
 
0.56 1.00 
Public Utilities 2.50 * 2.51 ** 3.68 *** 3.95 *** 
Services -0.42 
 
-0.32 
 
0.89 
 
1.25 
 Constant 13.85 *** 13.85 *** -3.06 *** -2.21 ** 
No Obs (b) 765  755  739  664  
Wald chi2 180 *** 159 *** 622 *** 130 *** 
LR test (chi2) 815 *** 806 *** 476 *** 342 *** 
 
Notes: The table presents the z-value.  
            Legend: * Significance at 10% level; ** Significance at 5% level; *** Significance at 1% level 
